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Return migration, also referred as an out-migration, is an important research topic within the 
labor economics. The main questions investigated within this field are concerned with the 
selection of the returners and the factors, affecting immigrants’ decision to leave.  
This thesis investigates an income effect on the probability to out-migrate. The main scope of 
analysis covers Eastern European immigrants in Norway. The countries of origin are divided 
into the regions, both inside and outside the European Union, to examine the impact of the EU 
factor on the immigrants’ behavior. The micro data of the immigrants’ has been provided by 
Norwegian center for research data (NSD). The sample contains 10% of all Eastern European 
population in Norway. 
The following questions are brought up: i) do low income earners or high income earners 
have a higher probability to out-migrate? ii) what are common demographic characteristics of 
the returners? iii) do the citizens of EU differ from the non-citizens in their out-migration 
behavior? 
The analysis is conducted on the individual level, using the linear probability model to predict 
the likelihood of out-migration. The empirical results of this study reveal that immigrants with 
the lowest income or no income at all are most likely to out-migrate, compared to middle and 
high income groups. The effect of income on return migration is higher in times of economic 
recession. The citizens of the EU countries are mostly affected by the low income. In 
addition, the analysis outputs indicate that growing income decreases the probability of return 
migration. 
The data has been analyzed with the statistical software Stata/IC 14.1. 
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Immigration is a wide area in labor economics which has become especially important in the 
end of 20th century.  Extensive research has been done to reveal the actual problems and 
implications within this field.  Recently a new trend within international migration has drawn 
the attention of the economists: temporary migration since many migrants actually return 
home. Despite the fact that theoretical literature on return migration is quite limited, it is 
important to note that quite the topic has been investigated. Main questions arise on the 
selection of return migrants. Who actually returns and who stays in the host country? What 
factors may affect individuals’ decision to return? Are these reasons exclusively economic or 
do they also include “social” factors? Does high income affect that decision positively or 
negatively?  
The most cited research on the topic is conducted by Borjas and Bratsberg in 1996. They 
argue that main reasons for return migration are i) an initial plan to migrate for a certain time 
period in order to accumulate capital or wealth; or ii) failure to succeed in a new country. 
They also conclude that immigrants are more likely to return to rich countries.  
The main purpose of this thesis is to investigate an income effect on the probability to out-
migrate. Higher wages is one of the main reasons that motivate people to work abroad. The 
question is: what influence does the income have on immigrants’ motivation to stay in a host 
country or leave? On one hand, an increase in income substantially improves the quality of 
life and provides an incentive to stay. On the other hand, people with higher income may 
achieve their goals faster than others and then return to their country of origin, because they 
prefer to live and spend the accumulated capital at home. When it comes to low income, it is 
reasonable to assume that low earners are less motivated to stay in the host country and out-
migrate sooner than other income groups. Nevertheless, they might be persistent in reaching 
their specific goals, so the low income will just prolong their stay until they finally achieve it. 
This thesis aims at analyzing whether it is highest or lowest income earners who have higher 
probability to return migrate. When it comes to middle income workers, I intend to use them 
as a reference group in the analysis and investigate the behavior of all mentioned income 
groups comparing to this one.  
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The question of interest in such studies is also the situation in the home country. Are 
immigrants more likely to return home if economic conditions of the source country improve? 
In line with the previous literature, I include in my analysis the data on annual GDP growth in 
source countries to address this issue.  
The aim of this study is to contribute to the body of literature on out-migration by analyzing 
the behavior of a specific group of immigrants. The main scope of analysis covers Eastern 
European immigrants in Norway.  After the expansion of the EU in 2004 (Lithuania, Latvia, 
Estonia, Poland, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia) and 2007 
(Bulgaria, Romania) the flow of immigrants from Europe to Norway increased rapidly. 
Norway has become a popular emigration destination due to high salaries and overall better 
quality of life. According to Statistics Norway, between 2004 and 2014 a total of 138,000 
people immigrated from the new EU-members in Eastern Europe to find a job in Norway. 
During the same period, 40,200 immigrated to Norway due to family relations with one of the 
immigrant workers. About 22,000 of them eventually returned home.  
The aspiration of this study is to find common features within the group of Eastern European 
workers and to analyze their return migration patterns. Next to the EU member states, Russia, 
Ukraine and Balkan countries are considered in the analysis. The main part of my research 
focuses on two years: I study 2009 and 2013 to investigate whether the income effect on 
return migration is different in times of crisis (the global crisis of 2008, also known as The 
Great Recession) and economic growth (in 2013). I also analyze EU and non-EU countries 
separately.   
Based on the above, this thesis addresses the following research questions: i) do low income 
earners or high income earners have a higher probability to out-migrate? ii) what are common 
demographic characteristics of the returners? iii) do the citizens of the EU differ from the non-
citizens in their out-migration behavior? 
The empirical results of my study show that immigrants with the lowest income or no income 
at all are most likely to out-migrate, compared to middle and high income groups. The effect 
of income on return migration is higher in times of economic recession. The citizens of the 
EU states are mostly affected by the low income. In addition, the analysis outputs indicate 
that growing income decreases the likelihood of return migration. The correlation between 
return migration and economic growth is negative in times of crisis and non-existing when the 
economy thrives.  
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A similar study has been conducted by Bijwaard and Wahba (2013) on immigrants in 
Netherlands, where they investigated whether the high-income or low-income recipients 
return home faster. Their findings have shown that both highest and lowest income earners 
are most likely to out-migrate, comparing to the other income groups. The main aim of my 
research is to examine how immigrants in Norway respond to higher wages, while accounting 
for demographic characteristics of return migrants, such as age, gender and civil status. 
Statistics Norway (SSB) has performed an analysis in 2016, where they investigated the 
probability of return migration or moving to another region of a country for different groups 
of immigrants. This particular study differs from mine in two important aspects. SSB 
conducted their research on all immigrants in Norway, while the focus of my study is 
specifically Eastern Europe. Furthermore, SSB does not investigate the income effect on the 
return migration. 
The outline of this paper is as follows. In chapter 2, I discuss the empirical literature on the 
subject. Chapter 3 presents the data and overview of my sample, also discusses income 
distribution in details. Chapter 4 contains the statistics of immigration and out-migration in 
Norway, while in chapter 5 the main model and the separate analysis on EU and non-EU 
countries conducted for this research are presented. Chapter 6 contains the results of a 




2. Relevant empirical literature 
 
2.1. Theoretical introduction 
 
It is important to keep in mind that the topic of return migration has not yet been touched in 
theoretical literature in much detail, and the number of sources therefore is small. However, 
many practical researches have been conducted in the last decades. First of all, it is worth 
noticing that not only economic reasons drive immigrants away from the host country. 
According to Dustmann and Görlach (2015), the common reason for return migration is 
preference of consumption in the country of origin. However, since the purpose of this paper 
is to investigate the income effect, I will focus on the economy.   
The theory provided in empirical literature predicts a skill-based and income-based selection 
in the cohort of return migrants. If an immigration flow to a host country mostly includes the 
high-skilled individuals, the less skilled ones will eventually out-migrate. In contrary, if the 
immigrants possessing low skills prevail in the host country, the most skilled will leave 
(Borjas and Bratsberg, 1996). Individuals with lowest income will out-migrate in higher rates 
than others (Bijwaard and Wahba. 2013; Kangasniemi and Kauhanen, 2013). However, the 
highest income gainers are also more likely to leave, according to Bijwaard and Wahba. 
Attachment to labor market seems to be a very significant factor to stay in the host country 
(Constant and Massey, 2003; Bijwaard, Schluter, Wahba, 2011; Kornstad, Skjerpen and 
Stambøl, 2016).  
In addition, the economic conditions in the source country may also affect the return 
migration. Immigrants are more likely to return to the countries with a high GDP per capita 
(Borjas and Bratsberg, 1996; Bijwaard and Wahba. 2013) and low unemployment rate 
(Bijwaard and Wahba, 2013).  






2.2. Previous studies   
 
Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) provide a solid theoretical framework on return migration from 
the United States. They analyze the behavior of immigrants by using data from Public Use 
Sample of the US together with micro data from the Immigration and Naturalization Service.  
Based on their argumentation on findings from previous studies by Borjas (1989) and Jasso 
and Rosenzweig (1988), they assume that out-migration can arise for two reasons. First, some 
of the initial immigrants may have planned a temporary migration in order to earn money or 
gain specific skills and then go back to their countries. Other reason is the failure of 
immigrants to make a good living in the host country, presumably because of the incorrect 
information about economic perspectives in the US or just bad luck. Furthermore, the authors 
construct a theoretical model, based on the difference in earnings in host and source countries, 
costs of immigration and return migration, potential skills of the immigrants. They examine 
the rate of return to skills in the source country relative to that in the US among the other 
dependent variables and assume a skill-selection in immigrant flows, affecting decisions on 
return migration. Further they show that return migration rate depends negatively on 
migration costs and positively on mean income in source countries; also that the migration 
costs are increasing functions of variable, interpreting distance between source and host 
countries. Thus they conclude that the immigrants tend to return to rich countries which are 
relatively close to the US. Their important findings reveal the correlation between 
outmigration and “richness” of the source country and distance between US and countries of 
origin. They conclude that migrants are more likely to return to well-doing countries which 
are placed not far away from United States. Another important implication is that return 
migration accentuate the type of initial selection that generated the immigrants’ flow. As they 
conclude, if the immigrant flow is positively selected, i.e. immigrants are high-skilled; the 
return immigrants will be the least skilled individuals. Conversely, if immigrant flow is 
negatively selected, the return migrants will be most skilled individuals. Even though the 
article provides us a good theoretical framework, it has some differences from the current 
situation in Europe. For example, the distance in terms of Europe may not be so important 
factor for making a decision to return. I also intend to focus on the immigration from Eastern 
Europe, where the economic situation of source countries is initially worse compared to 
“rich” Western Europe and Nordics. 
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Bijwaard, Schluter, Wahba (2011) examine the impact of labor market dynamics on the return 
migration by using administrative panel data on the entire population of new labor immigrants 
to The Netherlands. They point out that unemployment and return migration are prevalent 
events: at least one third of immigrants face unemployment and about 50% of all immigrants 
leave the host country in the observation period. Authors assume that duration of 
unemployment periods and potential re-employment has causal effect on immigrants’ 
decision to out-migrate. They construct a model using the “timing-of-events” method of 
Abbring and van den Berg (2003), where they measure employment, unemployment and 
migration durations for each immigrant.  All immigrants are divided in 3 groups: old (15 prior 
to 2004) EU countries, new and non-EU countries. They find that unemployment spells 
increase return probabilities for all immigrant groups, while re-employment spells typically 
delay returns. The precise impact on migration duration depends on both timing and lengths 
of the employment and unemployment spells. Authors also notice that the majority of 
immigrants are temporary rather than permanent.  
Bijwaard and Wahba (2013) analyze the effect of income earned in the host country on return 
migration by using administrative panel data of labor immigrants from developing countries 
to the Netherlands. They argue that the reasons affecting the migration duration are 
ambiguous. On one hand, the migrants would like to stay longer in the host country if their 
incomes are high; one the other hand, the gain from staying abroad diminishes, and that 
happens for two possible reasons: i) either the earners accumulate a certain capital and no 
longer have a need to work abroad, or ii) the income gap between host and source country is 
smaller for high-earners. Thus, there might be a positive or a negative effect of higher wages 
on the migration length. The authors refer to previous studies and claim that empirical 
evidence on this subject show very different results. To avoid bias in the results they account 
for the dependence of immigrants’ labor market status (employed, unemployed, non-
participant) and their income. They also control for unemployment rate and economic growth 
of the source country. Authors discover the U-shaped form in correlations between return 
migration and earnings, which means a higher intensity of return in low- and high-income 
groups. The interpretation of the fact that low-income migrants leave faster could be their 
failure, while high-income individuals leave because they achieve their goals (such as saving 
targets or gaining job skills).  
Dustmann and Görlach (2015) provide a theoretical framework to study temporary migration. 
They argue that expected temporariness of working abroad influence immigrants’ economic 
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behavior and thus generate possible consequences for host and source countries. Authors 
point out that economic literature on this topic is very limited, presumably because of poor 
quality of available data. Their general theoretical model allows an analysis of immigrations’ 
behavior under different assumptions on reasons and motives for return, such as preference of 
consumption in the country of origin, the purchasing power difference in home and host 
countries or temporarily higher earnings in the destination country. In terms of reasons for 
return, they conclude that the marginal utility of consumption in source country must be 
significantly larger than that in host country to affect individuals’ decision to return home 
despite the higher income abroad.  The purpose of migration in this case is the accumulation 
of capital in the host country for later consumption upon return. Another motive for 
temporary migration is the price difference in source and host countries driven by higher 
currency value in the host country. In this case migrants increase their consumption in long 
run by migrating and saving abroad. Temporary migration contributes to welfare of the source 
country via remittances sent from the host country: it is either a support for families left in 
country of origin, savings for future consumption or investments. When it comes to 
consequences for the receiving country, it benefits from absence of immigrants in their costly 
retirement years, while they spent their most productive years working in the host country. A 
negative consequence for host country is less investment, as immigrants tend to remit and 
invest in the source counties.  
Skjerpen, Stambøl and Tønnensen perform a research on return migration for Statistics 
Norway (SSB) on macro level. They study the effect of fluctuations in unemployment rate 
and GDP per capita on out-migration of immigrants in Norway in time period between 1990 
and 2012. They use these variables both for Norway and for the countries of origin. To 
conduct the analysis the authors use a time-series model. First they divide all immigrants in 3 
groups by the country of origin. The first group contains the immigrants from Western 
European countries, North America, Australia and New Zealand. The second group is 
especially interesting for my study since it contains the immigrants from new Eastern 
European countries. The third group includes the immigrants from Asia, Eastern European 
countries outside the EU, Africa, Latin America and Oceania (except Australia and New 
Zealand). Afterwards the authors separate the individuals by age and gender into 36 groups 
altogether. According to them, out-migration rate is the highest for the first geographic group 
(Western European countries, North America, Australia and New Zealand).  They find that 
macroeconomic factors have some influence on the return migration, but not as large as it 
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could be expected and not for all immigrants’ groups. The out-migration of the individuals 
from the second group (Eastern Europeans in the EU) is influenced by the fluctuations of 
unemployment rate in Norway. However, the unemployment rate in their countries and the 
difference in GDP per capita between Norway and the source countries do not have any 
impact on their return migration1. 
Kornstad, Skjerpen and Stambøl (2016) conduct another research on return migration for 
Statistics Norway (SSB). They analyze the factors that affect immigrants to emigrate from 
Norway, as well as their decision to move to another region within the country or remain 
settled in the same region. The authors use micro data to reveal how the variables as age, 
gender, length of residence, educational level or attachment to labor market can influence 
individual’s decision to move or stay. In this research authors do not provide any kind of 
theoretical framework, instead they base their analysis on previous reports from Statistics 
Norway and compare results. However, their findings are interesting in matters of better 
understanding of the out-migrated individuals’ personal characteristics. First they use linear 
probability method to obtain certain results and then they conduct a logit model to confirm 
their findings. They conclude that male immigrants are more likely to emigrate than female; 
younger individuals of working age have higher probability to out-migrate than middle-aged 
or older immigrants; increasing length of residence decreases their chances to move away. 
They also consider the reasons for immigration and conduct that individuals with refugee 
status are less likely to emigrate, however they have a high tendency to move within the 
country. Those with education as the reason for emigration, as well as immigrants from 
Nordic countries, show the highest probability to out-migrate. Measured by attachment to 
labor force market, those who are outside the labor force and the educational system are most 
likely to leave the country, while employed individuals show the lower probability for out-
migration. When it comes to domestic relocation, immigrants show the highest tendency to 
move from the least central municipalities, while most central ones remain settled in. This 
study differs from my paper by at least two important points. First, SSB conducte their 
research on all immigrants in general, while I focus on some particular regions. And more 
importantly, they do not use income in their model.  
Kangasniemi and Kauhanen (2013) examine an economic assimilation of Estonian 
immigrants in Finland and their return migration. They argue that empirical literature does not 
                                                          
1 I originally included the unemployment rate of the source countries and its interactions with the income in my 
model, but since I have not found any significant results, I decided not to keep this variable.  
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sufficiently cover the selective nature of out-migration, and its possible impact on distortion 
of assimilation measures. The authors measure economic assimilation of Estonian immigrants 
as they compare their earnings and employment with the natives. They are also interested in 
factors affecting out-migration. Their results show that poor labor market performance, as 
much as being outside the labor force, positively affects the out-migration from Finland. 
Younger people assimilate more easily as the wage gap between immigrants and natives in 




3. Data description  
 
To perform my research I have been provided with panel data by Norwegian Centre for 
Research Data (NSD). Data contains information on 10% of Eastern European immigrants in 
Norway in period 2000 – 2013, in total 20,952 individuals. Due to anonymity protection 
source countries are divided into 6 regions. To simplify the further description I have named 
these regions as followed:  
• Poland; 
• Baltics (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia); 
• CIS2 (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine); 
• RoBuMo (Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova); 
• Balkans (all countries of the Balkan peninsula); 
• CzSloHun (Czech Republic, Slovenia, Hungary). 
Poland has been given as a separate category since the amount of its immigrants is big enough 
to protect their anonymity.  
The essential difference between given countries lies in the fact that not all of them are 
members of the EU. CIS and most of Balkans stay outside the group (except for Greece which 
has been the member since 1981 and Croatia which joined in 2013). Thus there is also a 
difference between their immigration patterns.  
The citizens of the EU are not burdened with any bureaucratic obstacles to come and work in 
Norway. Actually, all they have to do is to find a job and sign a contract for it. There are no 
restrictions on industry sectors or level of their competence; any kind of legal job serves as a 
ground for them to stay in the country.  Then they have to go to the police and get a residence 
permit based on the working contract. Afterwards they obtain an ID-number from a tax office.  
                                                          
2 CIS - The Commonwealth of Independent States, also called the Russian Commonwealth, is a political and 
economic confederation of 9 member states and 2 associate members, all of which are former Soviet 




When it comes to countries outside the EU, it is important to note that they have more 
restrictions to immigrate. Only educated and skilled professionals have an opportunity to 
work in Norway. Normally they must find a job first. Their employers have to thoroughly 
explain to the Norwegian Directorate of immigration the grounds for hiring a certain foreign 
worker. Then the newly - employed have to apply for residence permit for work.  Another 
ground to legally come and stay in Norway is to get married to a Norwegian citizen or 
resident. In this case the receiving party has to prove to be financially able to take the 
responsibility for their spouse.  
Even though the immigrants from the EU and non-EU countries have certain differences, it 
feels wrong to exclude the latter from the analysis as it would not be complete.  
I possess the data of age, gender, date of immigration and out-migration (for whom it is 
relevant), marital status, amount of children under 18 years old, educational stage, yearly 
income (divided in intervals), industry sectors of employees. The information is updated 
yearly.  
Data on income has been given to me in a form of intervals instead of concrete numbers in 
kroner. There are six intervals (or groups) altogether: no income, Income 0, Income 1, Income 
2, Income 3 and Income 4, where Income 0 and Income 4 represents the lowest and the 
highest income groups, respectively. The amount of Norwegian kroner for each group have 
also been provided (the intervals are extending each year). Thus, Income 0 in year 2000 
defines earnings between 1 – 98 thousand Norwegian kroner, and in the year 2013 the same 
interval is between 1 – 173 thousand NOK. I discuss the income statistics between different 
groups in the next subchapter. 
Since years of interest in this particular study are 2009 and 2013, Table 1 provides the main 
features of the sample for years before the year of leaving (2008 and 2012 respectively). 
Individuals who still live in Norway in 2009 (or 2013) are defined as stayers, while those who 
have left the country in 2009 (2013) are leavers.  The table gives us some information which 
makes it possible to foresee the results of estimation, conducted in Chapter 5. We can see that 
male immigrants’ percentage is higher in leavers both years, especially in 2008-2009. 
Moreover, I would predict a stronger effect in 2009 since the percentage difference is bigger 
between stayers and leavers that year.  The part of non-EU immigrants between leavers is 
more than twice less than stayers in 2009, while in 2013 the percentage is close for both 
groups. I would therefore predict that estimate coefficient on non-EU variable is negative in 
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2009. When it comes to education and industry sectors, there is a very significant difference 
between percentage of leavers and stayers: those who out-migrated miss substantially more 
information than those who stayed.  
 
Table 1. Demographic characteristics of the sample, years 2008 and 2012 
 2008-2009 2012-2013 
 Stayers Leavers Stayers Leavers 
Male 57% 83% 60% 72% 
Non-EU citizens 28% 12% 18% 16% 
Missing data on 
education 
33% 98% 36% 70% 
Missing data on 
industry 
49% 73% 47% 80% 
Married  46% 29% 48% 32% 
Have at least 1 
child under 18 
27% 4% 30% 10% 
Age 15 – 24  15% 15% 13% 15% 
Age 25 –  35 47% 47% 46% 49% 
Age 36 – 50 34% 33% 35% 29% 
Age 51 – 74  4% 5% 6% 7% 
Staying (mean)3 3,2 years 1,8 years 3,3 years 2,3 years 
No income 6% 25% 8% 42% 
Income 0 24% 46% 25% 34% 
Income 1 20% 15% 20% 11% 
Income 2 25% 8% 25% 8% 
Income 3 17% 3% 15% 2% 
Income 4 7% 1% 6% 3% 
2008: 5416 observations, where 307 out-migrated in 2009. 812 children (age under 15) have been excluded from 
the sample.2012: 13473 observations, whereas 558 out-migrated. 1703 children excluded. 
 
I can only assume that these immigrants came to the country for a short period of time and 
neglected/did not spend enough time to provide information about their educational level 
                                                          
3 Average migration duration in the sample for leavers and stayers.  
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because they were not planning to stay in Norway for a long period of time. In fact, the same 
reason about missing information on education is provided in SSB rapport mentioned in 
Chapter 2. Missing data about the industry sector may indicate that these immigrants have had 
sporadic or even undeclared jobs (especially between the out-migrated individuals). However, 
it is worth mentioning, that the biggest part of those whose data on industry sectors we do 
have, work in constructions, outsourcing companies, manufacturing, accommodation and 
food services.  More than 75% of immigrants work within these industry sector in 2008 and 
2012.  
Being married and having children seems to have a negative impact on return migration: the 
amount of leavers is significantly lower for these individual. The percentage distribution 
between age groups is quite similar for both stayers and leavers. It is difficult to predict any 
effect here. Migration duration for stayers is approximately 1 year longer.  
The percentage distribution between income groups shows some interesting patterns. Those 
are very similar for both years. The percent of leavers with no income or the lowest income is 
significantly higher between leavers. Starting from Income 1, however, the picture is 
reversed: there is a higher amount of stayers within these income intervals. Thus, my 
assumption is that the lowest income earners and those with no income at all have a higher 
probability to out-migrate.  
The data has some imperfections which have to be mentioned. There is a certain amount of 
missing personal information when it comes to variables such as education, marital status and 
industry sectors. Thus, the analysis is based on provided data and the results might be affected 
by this missing piece of it. Moreover, missing part on education and industry between return 
migrants is too big to include it in the regression; the results might be much distorted. 
Another issue concerns the inaccuracy of the out-migration date. After 2010 it became more 
complicated to track and register the process of moving out. According to the new EU legal 
guideline, the immigrants from EU, who are planning to stay in Norway for at least 3 months, 
need to get a residence permit from the police. The permit is valid for unlimited time period 
and does not need to be extended. Thus immigrants are free to leave the country without 
giving a notice to the state. After two or more years of being absent these individuals are 
considered moved out. This is called administrative out-migration. However, the out-
migration date in these cases is always the date of administrative decision and not the actual 
moment of leaving. According to Vassenden (2015) the amount of administrative out-
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migration has raised over time. In period 1971 – 2011 about 19% of yearly out-migration was 
considered administrative, while after 2010 those numbers went up to between 20 and 30. It is 
a common problem for many OECD countries, according to the out-migration report by 
Dumont and Spielvogel (2008). 
 
3.1. Descriptive statistics of income distribution 
 
In this subchapter I discuss the summary information about immigrants’ yearly earnings. This 
deeper description helps to gain a better understanding of immigrants’ income situation in 
Norway. It gives me also an opportunity to compare the earnings between different 
demographic groups. These groups are included in my model, presented in Chapter 5. Tables 
2 and 3 provide the amount of individuals (percentage) within each income group for the 
years 2008 and 2012. All individuals with missing data on income from the table (less than 
1% of all observations) were excluded, as well as children younger than 15 years old.  
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of income in EU and non-EU regions, by gender and marital status, in 2008 (%) 







































































In thousand NOK: Income0: yearly income 1–151, Income1: yearly income 152–251,                                                                                   
Income2: yearly income 252–349, Income3: yearly income 350–465; Income4: yearly income 466–1020. 
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First I examine the year 2008. On average, most of the EU citizens (almost 26%) earn within 
interval 2 (yearly income 252000–349000 NOK), 8% does not have any income, and only 6% 
earn within the highest earnings interval. It is worth mentioning that the average gross salary 
in Norway in 2008 is around 410 thousand NOK, which falls into the interval Income 3 in this 
range. Thus we can conclude that more than 77% of citizens from EU area earn less than 
average.  
Women from the EU-area make a highest percent within the lowest income interval. Men earn 
more: they make a higher percentage in groups Income 2, Income 3 and Income 4 (EU 
citizens). This could be explained by a traditional woman’s role of a housekeeper and 
babysitter, which is still a common pattern for Eastern European families. Despite the fact that 
women, on average, earn less, the percentage of men between leavers is considerably higher 
(as Table 1 shows).  
CIS region stands out from others in one particular way. In comparison to other regions 
mentioned above, where men immigrants prevail over women, in this particular region 
substantially bigger part of immigration is female: 68% against 32%. As we know, countries 
of CIS are not members of EU, which makes it a lot more complicated for their citizens to get 
a job in Norway. However, a lot of Russian and Ukrainian women get married to Norwegian 
citizens and come to the country for family reunion. In addition, many students come to 
Norway to complete a master degree.  
Balkan region is not a part of EU either. I can assume that part of its immigrants came as 
refugees during the conflict in Balkan Peninsula in late 90’s. There also might be students, 
wives and working immigrants. We cannot exclude working immigrants from these two 
regions. Usually it is high-skilled individuals who get job offers in IT or oil industries. As the 
table shows, 11% of men from non-EU earns within the highest income group, while EU men 
make 7%.  
However, the most individuals (both male and female) from non-EU area earn within the 
lowest income group. A curious fact; 46% of single non-EU immigrants are in the lowest 
income group. I can assume that this part of the table is mostly represented by students, who 
are legally permitted to work no more than 20 hours a week.  
Single people earn less than married: this is common for both areas. Besides, there is the 
lowest percent of individuals with no income between married people.   
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As Table 3 shows, in 2012 income distribution between regions and groups is very similar to 
that in 2009. In fact, all patterns discussed above are the same here. Most of the EU citizens 
earn within Income 2, while those from non-EU make the biggest part of Income 0. Again, 
single individuals prevail in intervals 0, 1 and 2, while the most of married individuals earn 
within intervals 2, 3 and 4. However, the difference in earnings between men and women is 
much smaller in non-EU area, compared to EU and both regions in 2008.  
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of income in EU and non-EU regions, by gender and marital status, in 2012 (%) 







































































In thousand NOK: Income0: yearly income 1-173; Income1: yearly income 174-286; Income2: yearly income 
287-398; Income3: yearly income 399-535; Income4: yearly income 536-1609.  
 
Chapter 5.3 presents the results of an out-migration analysis for the EU and non-EU citizens 
separately. It allows us to see how the income distribution, described in this subchapter, 





3.2. Economic growth by regions 
 
The conditions in economy of the source country are interesting in terms of return migration. 
Previous researches have clearly shown that it.  has an effect on the intensity of out-migration. 
To analyze this effect Borjas and Bratsbeg (1996) have used GDP per capita, while Bijwaard 
and Wahba (2013) included GDP per capita, economic growth (GDP%) and unemployment 
rate. In the sample provided to me, it is more complicated to include macroeconomic factors 
of the source country: due to the fact that immigrants are divided by regions instead of 
countries4. Nonetheless, there is a way to address this problem. Since I know exactly how 
many immigrants have come to Norway in each particular year (Statistics Norway provide 
this information), I can estimate a weighted average percent for GDP growth of each region.  
Let us take Baltics as an example, including three countries: Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.  
Thus: 
GDP in Baltics = (percentage of Lithuanian immigrants*GDP growth in Lithuania) + 
(percentage of Latvian immigrants*GDP growth in Latvia) + (percentage of Estonian 
immigrants*GDP growth in Estonia). 
 
Figure 1. Weighted annual GDP growth (%) by regions, years 2009 and 2013 
 
 
                                                          
4 Except for Poland. 
baltics CIS robumo czslohu balkans poland
2009 -14.64 -9.15 -6.13 -5.6 -1.89 2.82



























Figure 1 presents the weighted GDP growth in percent for each region, counted by formula 
above. As we can see, in 2009 each region (except for Poland) has experienced a significant 
decrease in economic growth.  The most significant recession was faced by Baltic region (all 
Baltic countries have had about 14% decrease in annual GDP), followed by CIS (-7% in 
Russian, -14% in Ukraine and +0.2% in Belarus). Poland, however, experienced a growth.  
After several years the economic situation in Europe has settled down. In 2013 all regions 
have had a positive economic growth. In this case, again, Baltics are ahead of others with 3% 





4. Immigration and return migration statistics in Norway  
 
This chapter discusses the immigration and out-migration flows from East Europe to Norway 
(and vice versa). The data is collected from Statistics Norway web-site. Figure 2 shows the 
immigration and out-migration rates for all regions from my sample in years 2000 – 2013.  
We can see that a red immigration line continually increases from 2000 to 2008, and in 2009 
there is a significant drop. Below the detailed description of immigration is provided.   
Year 2001 shows the lowest amount of immigrants who moved out from Norway. All the way 
until 2009 we can see that out-migration rates grow in accordance to growing immigration 
rates. If we compare years 2000 and 2008 (the year before the significant drop in 
immigration) we see that amount of immigrated has increased by 7 times (3460 and 23920 
respectively), while the amount of out-migrated has grown by 6 times (from 600 to 3620). It 
is quite logical since a big part of the migration is temporary. We assume that despite the 
growing immigration to a host country, the percentage part of temporary immigration remains 
the same.   
 
Figure 2. Immigration and out-migration rates of Eastern Europeans in Norway years 2000 – 2013 
 























Immigration and out-migration in Norway
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The first difference from the described pattern is seen in 2009 when immigration drops 
considerably, while the out-migration grows by 50%. However, there is nothing surprising 
about the situation. Year 2009 has been economically unsuccessful for the host country which 
explains the fact that the out-migration has not dropped, but significantly increased instead. It 
continued growing in 2010, and then in 2011 and 2012 the trend has slightly diminished. The 
year 2012 reveals a high increase in immigration comparing to 2009, while the out-migration 
is 30% lower in comparison. This fact reveals that economic situation in the host country has 
improved which reflects the migration trends. The trend changes again in 2013 which is the 
latest year in my data sample. We can see from the chart that so called net-migration 
(immigration minus out-migration) drops again. Even though I do not have an access to the 
micro data in later years, Statistics Norway provides the data on common trends on the topic. 
Starting from 2013 immigration rates drop, out-migration steadily grows, which implicates 
diminishing net-migration every year.  
There might be at least two reasons for that. First, an enhanced process of legalization took 
place after the amount of immigrants significantly raised. Newly arrived immigrants are tend 
to accept any job they can find. They often get a temporary job with an opportunity to prolong 
the employment after it ends. Another example is a job with a restricted (small) amount of 
working hours. In these cases immigrants usually get a permanent D-number instead of an ID. 
The main difference between these two is that the D-number has to be prolonged every 6 
months, while the ID is permanent. Another reason is the notorious oil crisis that started in 
2014, when the oil prices began to drop drastically (however this fact does not explain a net-
migration drop in 2013). As an oil country, Norway has been considerably influenced by the 
crisis. Unemployment rate has been growing in years 2013 – 2017. Even though the oil sector 
has suffered the most, it has had the influence on overall employment in the country. 
However, the migration situation after 2013 is outside this particular study.  
Further I present Figures 3 and 4 which show the distribution between immigrants divided by 
EU and Non-EU regions.  
As we can see from Figure 3, years 2000 - 2004 have been steady; immigration rate from 
Eastern Europe did not exceed 2000 individuals a year. However, starting from 2004, the 
situation begins changing. As the EU expended with 10 new members5 the immigration flow 
started to grow rapidly. It is especially noticeable for Poland and Baltic countries. In year 
                                                          
5 Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia 
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2007 the immigration flow from Poland was twice as big comparing to year before (from 
7280 to 14110). 
 
 
Figure 3. The immigration rates for EU area, years 2000 - 2013 
 
1 – Poland, 2 – Baltics, 4 – RoBuMo, 6 – CzSloHun 
 
 
However, in 2009 there is a 30% reduction in Polish immigrants, leading to a significant 
reduction in immigration that year (even though the numbers for Baltics and RoBuMo have 
increased). This can be explained by the fact that year 2009 has been economically bad for 
Norway itself. GDP is negative for the first time in several years and unemployment rate has 
grown. We can assume that it was harder for new immigrants to find a job and for those who 
immigrated earlier – to keep their current jobs. In year 2010 the situation changes again and 
the amount of arriving starts to grow again until it drops slightly in years 2012 and 2013.  
Baltics is the second largest group of immigrants in Norway. The continual growth of the 
immigration flow started in 2004, and in 2011 it reaches its peak – around 11 000 (comparing 
to year 2007 it has tripled). The trend changes its direction in 2012, when the immigration rate 















Regions 4 and 6 have also shown a growth in immigration rates since their countries have 
joined the EU (2007 and 2004 respectively). However, the flow from these countries is 
remarkably lower comparing to the first two regions. This can be explained by the fact that 
the majority of these countries have comparatively low emigration rates (numbers fluctuate 
around 1-4% while in Baltics they are around 12-18%). In addition, these countries are much 
further from Norway comparing to Baltics and Poland. We can assume that Western 
European countries might look more attractive geographically.  
Figure 4. The immigration rates for EU area, years 2000 - 2013 
 
3 – CIS, 4 - Balkans 
 
Now take a look at the Figure 4. When it comes to region 3 and 5 (mostly not members of 
EU), we can see that immigration flows from there have been steady over the observed time 
period with a little increase from Balkans in 2012. According to Statistics Norway, in 2012 
there was a significant growth of immigration from Greece and Serbia, which caused a 
growth in the whole Balkans region. The immigration from Greece is most likely caused by 
Greek government-debt crisis, which started with the Great Recession in 2008 and got a 
significant evolvement in Greece after 2010. Interestingly, immigration from CIS and Balkan 
















5. The out-migration analysis 
 
5.1. Model design  
 
To conduct my research I use linear probability (LPM) model. LPM is a multiple linear 
regression model with a binary dependent variable (Woolridge: Introductory econometrics, 4th 
edition). In other words, dependent variable y takes on only two values: zero or one. If y is a 
binary outcome, then we expect that 
P(y=1|x) = β0 + β1x1 + … + βkxk = x’β + ε, 
which implies that, in my specific setting, the probability of out-migration, p(x) = P(y=1|x), is 
a linear function of the xj. Thus, the probability of out-migration is linear in the parameters βj. 
In the LPM, βj measures the change in the probability that y=1 when xj changes, holding other 
factors fixed: 
Δ P(y=1|x) = βj Δxj. 
The identifying assumption in the model is that E (εj|xj) = 0, such as E (yj|xj) = x’β. 
This implies that  
E (yj|xj) = 1* P(y=1|x) + 0*P(y=0|x) = P(y=1|x) = p(x) = x’β. 
The LPM implies that x’β is a probability and it is supposed to lie between 0 and 1. The main 
problem of the LPM is that this is not always the case in practice.  
Another issue with LPM is that its variance is heteroskedastic (depending on x): 
Var (y|x) = E (y|x)2 – [E (y|x)2 = (12 * p(x) + 0 * p(x)) – (p(xj))
2] = p(x) (1 – p(x)) = x’β (1 – 
x’β). 
Nonlinear binary choice models such as logit and probit do not face issues the LPM faces. 
However, I have chosen the linear probability model for the following reasons. First, the issue 
of heteroscedasticity can be solved by using robust standard errors. Second, when it comes to 
probability outside (0, 1) interval, this is not necessarily an issue, according to Angrist and 
Pischke (2009). In their book, “Mostly harmless econometrics”, they argue that marginal 
effects of LPM are in practice very close to those of logit and probit. The estimates of 
nonlinear models are not possible to interpret directly: we have to compute their marginal 
24 
 
effects. Moreover, there are some decisions which have to be made before the estimation, 
such as the weighting scheme or derivatives versus finite differences. If we are mostly 
interested in marginal effects of the variables, the LPM is an easier way.  
In the LPM, βj measures the change in the probability of observing 0 or 1 when xj changes, 
holding other factors fixed, it implies that βj has a causal effect on dependent variable. This 
effect is easily computable. If independent variable is a dummy, the probability of out-
migration increases by βj*100 percentage points if xj=1. For quantitative variables 1 unit 
increase in xj also increases the probability by βj*100 percentage points.  
It is important to note that the identifying assumption E (εj|xj) = 0 is likely not to hold in this 
case. In fact, it will hold in an ideal model, where absolutely all possible explanatory variables 
are taken into account. This is unlikely in most of the situations. We can think of other 
explanatory variables which are possibly correlated with the existing independent variables. It 
means that we face an omitted variable problem, and our explanatory variables are 
endogenous, i.e. xj is correlated with ε. For example, the income of an out-migrated individual 
could be affected by health issues. Since we do not include health variable in the model, we 
can expect a correlation in the error term. Another example could be a purchasing power in 
the host country, which is clearly correlated with the income. If endogeneity is a case in this 
scenario, I cannot state that I estimate causal effect of explanatory variables on the income, 
but correlations. 
 In my model the dependent binary variable “leave” defines the probability of leaving the host 
country. The variable takes the value 1 for those who leave and 0 for those who stay.  
Thus, the model is described as follows: 
Leavei,t = β0 + β1malei + β2non-EU citizeni + β3marriedi,t-1 + β4civil missingi,t-1 + β5kidsi,t-1 + 
β6kids missingi,t-1  + β7lowest incomei,t-1  + β8highest incomei,t-1 + β9age25_35i,t-1 + 
β10age36_50i,t-1 + β11age51_74i,t-1 + β12stayingi,t-1 + ε, 
Where 
i – each individual, 
t – year of out-migration, 
t-1 – one year before the out-migration. 
Table 4 provides names and descriptions of each explanatory variable. 
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Table 4. Explanatory variables for the main model 





















dummy variable combining No income and Income 0 groups: 
individuals with the lowest earnings and those with no income at all, 
dummy variable for individuals with yearly income within interval 
Income 4, 
dummy variable for men, 
dummy variable for immigrants from countries outside EU (regions 3 
and 5), 
dummy variable indicating if person is married, 
dummy variable for individuals with missing information about their 
civil status, 
dummy variable indicating if person have children, 
dummy variable for individuals with missing information about 
children, 
dummy variable for individuals of age between 25 and 35 years old, 
dummy variable for individuals of age between 36 and 50 years old, 
dummy variable for individuals of age between 51 and 74 years old, 
quantitative variable indicating amount of years spent in Norway, 
quantitative variable for annual GDP growth in the region, 
an interaction of variables Lowest income and GDP, 
an interaction of variables Highest income and GDP. 
 
The analysis is designed as follows: I take independent variables for one particular year and 
check what influence they have on one’s decision to leave the host country the next year, 
whether they increase or diminish the probability of out-migration. The estimation is 






5.2. Main analysis 
 
I have decided to base my research on out-migration in 2009 and 2013. There are some 
essential reasons for choosing these particular dates. 2009 is the year of economic crisis in 
Norway and other countries, caused by The Great Recession – general economic decline in 
markets started in 2008. As mentioned in previous chapters, this year has had a decrease in 
net-migration, most probably caused by increased unemployment rate in the host country. 
Year 2013 is a year of economic growth in Norway. My intention is to compare the return 
migration in different economic circumstances. It is also the latest year in my sample, which 
provides me more data for the analysis.  
Table 5 shows estimation results and standard errors for year 2009 in two columns on the left 
side and 2013 on the right side. Regressions are conducted using independent variables for the 
years 2008 and 2012, respectively. I mark each estimation result with asterisks to provide t-
values which indicate statistical significance for each particular variable. I use the following 
reference groups: youngest female immigrants to check for age and gender, single without 
children to check for civil status, within the middle6 income group to check for earnings, a 
resident of an EU country.  
Estimation results for income variables are provided in the first two lines. As said before, all 
individuals in my sample are divided into intervals by income size: no income group, Income 
0, Income 1, Income 2, Income 3 and Income 47. Lowest income here is a combined variable 
for groups of immigrants with no income at all and those within the interval Income 0. It 
indicates the immigrants with lowest income. Highest income represents the individuals 
within the interval Income 4. Intervals Income 1, Income 2 and Income 3 are reference group 
and represent middle income.  
As we can see from the table, the lowest income variable has a positive sign both years, 
implying that individuals with lowest income are more likely to out-migrate in comparison 
with the reference group. 
                                                          
6 A group combined of Income 1, Income 2 and Income 3.  
7.For the year 2008: Inc 0: yearly income 1000 – 151000 NOK, Inc 1: 152000 – 251000 NOK,                                                                       
Inc 2: 252000 – 349000 NOK, Inc 3: 350000 – 465000 NOK; Inc 4: 465000 – 1200000 NOK. 
 For the year 2012: Inc 0: yearly income 1000 – 173000 NOK, Inc 1: 174000 – 286000 NOK,                                                                       




Table 5. The estimation results for the performed regression, years 2009 and 2013 
















































Age 25 – 35 
Age 36 – 50 






















































*** 1% significance value, ** 5% significance value, * 10% significance value; 2009: 5416 observations in 
total, whereas 307 individuals out-migrated; 2013: 13473 observations in total, whereas 558 individuals out-
migrated. 
 
In 2009 the probability to leave is by 16 percentage points or 263% higher for the lowest 
income group. The estimates for both years are statistically significant. Moreover, the 
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estimate for 2009 is much bigger than for 2013: 15,8 versus 7,7 percentage points (or 263 
versus 193%). It indicates that immigrants with little or no income are more vulnerable in the 
year of economic recession and therefore are more likely to leave the host country. However, 
those with the highest income are by 3 percentage points less likely to leave in 2009, 
compared to the reference group. The estimate for 2013 is not statistically significant, which 
means that people of highest income do not differ substantially from medium income group in 
their possible return migration decisions. 
We can see that men have a higher probability to leave than women, keeping all the other 
variables fixed. The estimation result in 2009 is three times higher than that in 2013: 7,8 
versus 2,7 percentage points.  
Residents of the non-EU countries are more likely to out-migrate in 2013. However, in 2009 
belonging to EU does not matter. This matter is discussed in next subchapter in more detail.  
When it comes to civil status, I have to handle data more carefully since this particular 
information about the individuals in the sample is not complete (see previous chapter about 
missing data). To address the missing data issue, I have divided immigrants into three groups: 
single (divorced and widowers are included in this group), married and individuals with 
missing information on their civil status – civil missing. I keep single as the reference group. 
As we can see, married individuals are less likely to leave the host countries than unmarried 
ones in 2013. However, in 2009 this variable is statistically insignificant. Variable civil 
missing is statistically insignificant both in 2009 and 2013, which means that people with 
missing data on their civil status do not affect the probability of leaving. 
Data on kids under 18 years old has the same complication as civil status. I handle this issue 
the same way as previously: including people with missing information on children in a 
separated group. Reference group is individuals without kids. Having children increases the 
probability to stay in the host country. The variable is strong and significant in both 2009 and 
2013. People with missing information on kids do not affect the return migration. 
When it comes to age, I consider individuals of 15-24 years old a reference group. In 
comparison to the reference group, older people are obviously more likely to leave, which is 
quite explainable. Those between age 15 and 19 are most likely to come to Norway not on 
their own, but on the grounds of family reunion. In this case they may have more intentions to 
stay in the country if their families also live in Norway. Those in age of 25-35 show higher 
leaving probability than other listed groups in 2013, which is also quite expected. Younger 
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people usually have fewer obligations as family, kids, wealth or carrier, and are more 
motivated to search for another, probably better place to live before they settle down. 
However, the results are slightly different for 2009. I can assume that in the year of economic 
recession older people are more vulnerable in the labor force marked.  
It is reasonable to assume that longer migration duration may negatively affect the decision to 
return. Over the years people get adjusted to the new environment, learn the new language 
(which is a case for Eastern Europeans in Norway) and get used to a life in the new country. 
Variable Staying measures the impact of one year in immigration on the probability to return. 
The sign on the estimate is negative which is consistent with my speculations on the topic. It 
indicates that each additional year lived in Norway decreases the probability to out-migrate by 
0.8 and 0.2 percentage points for years 2009 and 2013, respectively. Economically this 
variable is not strongly significant since after 10 years lived in Norway the probability to 
leave increases only by 8 and 2 percentage points respectively.  
The analysis of GDP growth has shown quite unexpected results. The estimate of the 
economic growth has a negative sign in 2009 and is statistically significant at 1% significance 
level. It indicates that 1 percentage point growth in source country’s GDP reduces the 
probability to leave by 0,2 percentage points. For the lowest income recipients, however, the 
impact of economic growth in origin land on return migration is positive. I can assume that 
those who earn within middle and high income groups are not motivated to return to the 
country of origin in times of economic recession, even though the economic growth in the 
home country is positive.   
 
5.3. EU and non-EU 
 
In first subchapter I presented the common model for all observed regions. However, it is 
reasonable to assume that immigrants from non-EU area may have different pattern in return 
migration. Here I intend to divide my model in two sub models for EU and non-EU citizens in 
order to describe their similarities and differences. Table 6 presents the estimation results of 
regressions, conducted for EU and non-EU immigrants separately, for the year 2013. Left 
column represents the results for common model. It is important to note that the amount of 
observations for non-EU immigrants is quite small, which might distort the picture.  
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It appears, that income effect is higher for EU residents. It is quite explainable because of 
demographic specifics of the non-EU group. As mentioned in Chapter 3, most of the non-EU 
immigrants are female. I assume that the majority of these women are not working 
immigrants, but wives and students. Thus they are less affected by their low incomes. The 
lowest income recipients from non-EU have 5,8 percentage points higher probability to leave, 
compared to the reference group, while for EU citizens this number is 8,7 (or 140 and 220%, 
respectively). 
The estimation results on gender and children are similar for both groups.  
Marriage, however, does not seem to affect the out-migration decision for non-EU citizens. 
Migration duration, on the other side, has a significant negative effect on leaving for non-EU 
citizens, moreover, the effect is higher than in common model. For EU immigrants this 
variable is not statistically significant. When it comes to age, the estimations for EU citizens 
are similar to those in main analysis, while they are insignificant for non-EU immigrants. The 
estimation of GDP growth did not show any significant results, same as in the main model. 
Table 7 presents the estimation results of regressions, conducted for EU and non-EU 
immigrants separately, for the year 2009. Left column, again, represents the results for 
common model. The amount of observations for non-EU immigrants is even smaller than in 
2013. 
The income effect of non-EU citizens is once again smaller than of the EU. The difference in 
estimates on the lowest income makes 14 percentage points which is quite a lot. The estimate 
of EU citizens is larger than for the common model. It indicates that in times of economic 
recession the EU citizens are even more sensible to low incomes. The estimate on highest 
income is negative for EU immigrants, just as in the common model. Male seem to have a 
lower probability to out-migrate if they initially come from non-EU area. Married people 
from EU are less likely to out-migrate; while for non-EU citizens this estimate is 
insignificant. The estimates on kids are similar in all cases. Age is significant for EU 
immigrants, but estimates show slightly bigger gap between groups, especially for the 
individuals of older age. 
The results of GDP growth estimation and its interactions are similar for the EU group and 




Table 6. Estimation results for year 2013: all regions, EU-citizens and non-EU citizens 
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Age 36 – 50 














































*** 1% significance value, ** 5% significance value, * 10% significance value; EU: 11078 observations in total, 








Table 7. Estimation results for year 2009: all regions, EU-citizens and non-EU citizens 
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*** 1% significance value, ** 5% significance value, * 10% significance value; EU: 3963 observations in total, 






6. Robustness analysis  
 
According to Heckman (2005), empirical findings are a joint product of both the data and the 
model. When constructing a model, it is not completely clear which control variables should 
be used in that model or what a functional form should be like, since the “true” model is 
unknown. There are many different ways to test a theory, and the problem is, that certain 
differences in methods may affect the results substantially. 
To check my main model for robustness I run a regression with slightly different independent 
variables. I keep demographic variables the same and use another income groups. I use all 
income groups from my sample and keep an interval Income 2 as reference.  
 
Table 8. Explanatory variables for the robust model 









dummy variable for individuals with no income at all, 
dummy variable for individuals with yearly income within interval 
Income 0, 
dummy variable for individuals with yearly income within interval 
Income 1, 
dummy variable for individuals with yearly income within interval 
Income 3, 
dummy variable for individuals with yearly income within interval 
Income 4. 
 
The new model is designed as follows: 
Leavei,t = β0 + β1malei + β2non-EU citizeni + β3marriedi,t-1 + β4civil missingi,t-1 + β5kidsi,t-1  + 
β6kids missingi,t-1  + β7noincomei,t-1 + β8income0i,t-1  + β9income1i,t-1  + β10income3i,t-1 + 
β11income4i,t-1  + β12age25_35i,t-1  + β13age36_50i,t-1  + β14age51_74i,t-1  + β15stayingi,t-1  + ε. 
 
Table shows the estimation result for the changed model. The difference in the demographic 
variables is very small; the only change is in non-EU variable estimate: it is significant now, 




Table 9. Estimation results for the changed model, years 2009 and 2013 
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Age 36 – 50 







































*** 1% significance value, ** 5% significance value, * 10% significance value; EU: 3963 observations in total, 
whereas 307 individuals out-migrated; non-EU: 1453 observations in total, whereas 51 individuals out-migrated. 
 
The results on the income estimation are generally consistent with the main model: i) the 
lower income earners are more likely to out-migrate than those of middle and higher income; 




The immigrants with no income at all are by 22,4 percentage points or 370% more likely to 
leave than the reference group (year 2009). Those with the lowest income have a 12,9 
percentage points or 320% higher probability to out-migrate than the reference group (year 
2009). We can see that the likelihood of return migration becomes smaller as income 
increases up to Income 3 in 2009 (or income 1 in 2013). Those who earn within the group 
Income 3 in 2009 have 2,3 percentage points or 40% smaller probability to leave. The 
estimates on higher income groups in 2013 are not statistically significant. Thus, again, I 
cannot confirm that the highest income earners have higher probability to leave in comparison 
with other groups.  
 
 
6.1. LOGIT model 
 
In this subchapter I proceed with the robustness analysis. Here I present the estimation results, 
obtained by using a LOGIT model, and keeping the same variables as in the main analysis. To 
make the comparison easier, Table 1 shows the estimates for both LPM and LOGIT.  
To test a consistency of the estimates in the main model, I compare its’ signs and significance 
levels with those in LOGIT. 
 For the main part, the estimates of the LOGIT are consistent with the LPM. There are several 
small differences. The estimation result of the highest income variable in 2009 is stronger in 
LOGIT model: it is statistically significant on 5% level. It indicates a stronger association 
between high income and presence in the host country. 
Non-EU variable in 2013, on the contrary, is less significant in LOGIT. In chapter 3 I made 
some assumptions on the estimation outcomes, based on the percentage proportions between 
the stayers and the leavers. I expected to find a minimal or non-existing effect of non-EU in 
2013 on the return migration. Obviously, we cannot trust this hypothesis more than the 







Table 10. Estimation results for LPM and LOGIT models, years 2009 and 2013 
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*** 1% significance value, ** 5% significance value, * 10% significance value; 2009: 5416 observations in 




All age variables make less significant estimates in LOGIT, especially within the group of 51-
74.  When it comes to GDP growth and its interactions, these variables seem to be not 
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significant in LOGIT. Thus, I cannot confirm the theory about the influence of economic 
growth in the host country on the probability to out-migrate. I have also checked the average 
marginal effects (AME) for the LOGIT model. The coefficients on all statistically significant 
variables in AME are very close to those in the LPM.   
 
6.2. Different years 
 
Even though I base my main analysis on two years (see the previous subchapter), it is also 
worth discussing, what the situation with out-migration is like in previous years. Are there 
many distinguishing features in different years, or does the out-migration have the same 
trends? To address this question, I intend to review the estimation results for years 2004, 
2007, 2010, 2011 and 2012. The analysis is built in the same way as in previous subchapter. I 
use the independent variables for the year before, to check how they affect the probability of 
leaving in that specific year.  
2004 may be the year of interest for out-migration since it is the first year of EU expansion, 
thus, the independent variables for 2003 have been used to perform a regression analysis. It is 
interesting to see how it worked before the expansion of the EU when the immigrants in my 
sample all had the same immigration rules. The first thing to mention is that income 
probability distribution has been similar to the years in main analysis, implying that lthe 
lowest income groups are more likely to out-migrate. The variable highest income has not 
been statistically significant. Looking ahead, this variable is not statistically significant in any 
other years that I have checked with only exception for 2009. It means that beyond the 
recession year, the highest income does not affect the probability to out-migrate. Further, 
there has been no significant difference in return migration probability between male and 
female in comparison to all the other years. In 2003 there was a larger part of female 
immigrants in Norway. I can presume that those women came to Norway either for marriage 
or to study. This leads to an assumption that the part of working immigrants that year was 
quite small. It is more usual that men, not women, go abroad looking for better economic 
perspectives. Even if men are married, they usually emigrate alone first, find a job, settle and 
then expect their spouse to come for family reunion. That’s why after 2004 male and female 
proportion changes significantly, which also leads to higher probability for men to out-
migrate. I assume that the main reason in higher out-migration rates between men in 
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following years is not the gender itself, but being a part of working immigration cohort. Other 
variables like civil status, migration duration and children have shown very similar effects on 
dependent variable to those in main analysis.  
In 2007 there has already been a considerably higher amount or working immigrants, and the 
proportion of men and women has been equal. However, men showed the higher likelihood to 
leave. Again, I assume that this likelihood is mainly a reflection of the fact that working 
immigrants are more likely to leave. This trend remained in all following years. The estimates 
on variables for having kids and migration duration have been the same as in main analysis 
(civil status is not statistically significant which is also the case in 2009).  When it comes to 
income, the picture is similar to other years. The estimate on lowest income variable, 
however, is much smaller than that in 2009 and 2004.  
Years from 2010 to 2012 have some difference in income variables compared to the main 
analysis. Lowest income estimate for 2010 is slightly higher than in previous year, meaning 
that the lowest income group has a higher probability to leave than in 2009.  This can be 
explained as a reaction to the recession, the economy has not fully recovered from crisis 
shock. Nonetheless, in 2011 and 2012 there is a growth in economy again, and the probability 
to out-migrate is the lowest throughout all the previously discussed years. This also confirms 
the fact that in 2013 the return migration starts increasing again. Marriage is a statistically 
significant variable only in 2010, which clearly indicates that married and unmarried people 
usually face the same out-migration probabilities. Having kids, however, has been a strong 
statistically significant estimate throughout all the mentioned years. Variable for migration 
duration has also been negative and statistically significant, but not large economically 
speaking.  
An interesting trend has been noticed regarding EU-citizenship. As we can see from the main 
analysis table, the estimates on this variable are different, which makes the pictures quite 
ambiguous. On one hand, there are several reasons to assume that non-EU citizens would 
leave faster. They obviously face more legal issues when first coming and then staying in 
Norway. Students are given quite a short period of time to find a job after they have finished 
the studies (here it is also worth mentioning that only the job reflecting their education allows 
them to stay in the country). These who do not succeed finding a job are obligated to leave, 
even though they are willing to continue living in Norway. Women who get married to 
Norwegian citizens or residents have to live in Norway for a certain amount of time, staying 
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married, until they get a permanent residence permission or citizenship. Those who get 
divorced before this term have no legal right to stay in Norway and thus leave. Also those 
individuals who come with work purpose have to stay in a country for several years in order 
to get a permanent right of working and living in Norway. On the other hand, we know that 
EU citizens have a higher mobility within the Schengen area, thus they can travel around 
Europe without any bureaucratic complications. If they do not succeed in one country, they 
can always try another (especially if the initial plan is temporary migration). Considering the 
arguments it is hard to predict, what will the estimation results look like. After checking other 
years, I discovered that the causality of EU-citizenship has changed from negative to positive 
in 2011. It implies that before 2011 the non-EU citizens have had a lower probability to leave 




7. Discussion and concluding remarks 
 
The main goal of this research is to examine the relationship between the immigrants’ income 
and the probability of out-migration. The results of the main analysis in chapter 5 reveal a 
correlation between the lowest income group and the return migration.  Moreover, the impact 
of the low income is considerably stronger in the year of the economic recession. The analysis 
results in Chapter 5 indicate that the probability of low earning workers leaving Norway in 
2009 is 263% higher compared to the middle income group. In 2013 this probability makes 
193%. The analysis of the higher income recipients is less defined. In 2013, when the 
economy was thriving, the immigrants with the highest earnings did not reveal any correlation 
with the return migration likelihood. However, in 2009 they have 50% less probability to 
leave, compared to the middle income group. I assume that in times of economic crisis and 
uncertainty about the future people are more likely to hold on to their income and do not 
appreciate the risks of losing it. The robustness analysis, performed in chapter 6, confirm 
these results. In addition, the analysis outputs indicate that growing income decreases the 
likelihood of return migration for both years. Nonetheless, the estimates of all income groups 
under Income 2 are higher for 2009, indicating the higher probability to out-migrate.  
Non-EU citizens are less affected by low income, as indicates the analysis performed in 
Chapter 5.3.  The lowest income earners among non-EU citizens are 153% more likely to-out-
migrate in 2013, compared to the middle income group. The same income group among the 
immigrants from the EU area shows 208% higher likelihood to leave. Another interesting 
implication reveals that in times of crisis the EU citizens with the lowest income are more 
likely to out-migrate than in times of economic growth (245 versus 208%). However, this is 
not the case for the immigrants’ from non-EU area. In fact, they seem to show slightly lower 
probability to out-migrate in 2009 (131% versus 153%, years 2009 and 2013 respectively). As 
I discussed in chapter 5.3, this can be explained by the demographic differences between the 
EU and non-EU. There is considerably lower part of working immigrants among non-EU 
citizens, as discussed earlier in this thesis. This leads to a conclusion, that economic 
fluctuations have a strong impact on working immigrants, but it does not seem to affect the 
other types of immigrants (like students and wives).  
The results provided in Table 5 (main analysis) are mostly consistent with earlier studies. 
Some of them are consistent with Bijwaard and Wahba (2013). The demographic variables, 
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such as gender, presence of children and civil status, have the same effect in both studies.  
However, the most important question addressed is whether my findings of income effect on 
return migration are consistent with this research. The answer is: partly, as they reveal that the 
income of migrants in Netherlands has U-shaped effect on the probability to out-migrate, 
which means that both high and low income recipients are most likely to leave. Those with 
the lowest income show highest intensity of leaving. In my case, individuals within the lowest 
income group are clearly more likely to out-migrate than others. However, I cannot confirm 
that the highest income earners have higher probability to out-migrate than other income 
groups in between.  
The lowest income earners can be at least partly considered as people, who have not 
succeeded in the host country. It confirms the theory of Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) about the 
reasons of return migration.  Nonetheless, I cannot confirm the skill selection theory. In my 
opinion, the immigration flow from Eastern Europe to Norway is mostly negatively selected 
while low-skilled immigrants are clearly more tended to leave. As I discussed in Chapter 3, 
more than 75% of immigrants with known employment information (50% of the sample) 
work within industry sectors like constructions, outsourcing companies, manufacturing, 
accommodation and food services. It allows me to assume that the Eastern European 
immigrants are mostly low-skilled. Although I do not possess a lot of data on the returners 
(about 80% of them miss the information about the industry sectors), I do not have reasons to 
assume that they were high-skilled, since a big part of them earned within the lowest income 
group.  
My findings of the macroeconomic factors’ influence on the return migration are inconsistent 
with those from the studies, mentioned above. However, I confirm the results of SSB rapport 
(2015) which reveal no effect of GDP per capita and unemployment rate in the source country 
on the probability to out-migrate for Eastern Europeans specifically. They find, however, that 
this impact exists for other cohort of the immigrants: those from developed countries. It 
implies that Eastern Europeans have certain behavioral differences, compared to other 
regions. 
The analysis in Statistics Norway rapport on return migration (2016), conducted using the 
data for 2012, show similar results about gender, age and education. In particular, men tend to 
leave more often than women, which is the case throughout all years after EU expansion 
including the observation window 2012.  People in young age (25-35) are more likely to leave 
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than middle-aged (35-51) and older (51-74) immigrants. My results on length of residence are 
also consistent with SSB findings, although we used different measurement methods. In their 
study they divided migration duration in groups 0-2, 3-5, 6-10 and 11-15 years and used them 
as dummy variables. I used the migration duration as a quantitative variable. The conclusions 
are similar: length of residence affects the probability of return migration negatively. 
Furthermore, in order to check the impact of the family on the return migration I have used 
civil status and presence of children, both of the variables decrease the probability of leaving. 
In their study the number of family members has been used. Estimation shows a negative link 
between increase in family members and likelihood to out-migrate. SSB obtains full data on 
immigrants, thus they are able to measure the effect of educational level on return migration. I 
have received the information on educational level as well; however, the amount of 
observations provided on educational level was insufficient to develop a reliable regression 
model. However, there are indications that individuals with missing data on education are 
more likely to out-migrate, as discussed in Chapter 3. SSB confirms this outcome. In their 
analysis the immigrants with missing data on education have the highest probability to leave.  
There are some essential differences between my study and the rapport of SSB, nonetheless. 
First of all, Statistics Norway conducted their research on all immigrants in general, while I 
have examined some particular regions. However, many of the demographic characteristics 
appeared to be the similar for all immigrant groups. Furthermore, to measure “the level of 
success” in host country they use a labor market attachment and find that individuals with no 
labor market attachment leave faster. Finally, they investigate the impact of initial 
immigration reason on the return migration likelihood.    
There are several shortcomings in my research which have to be mentioned. First, the number 
of out-migrated individuals is quite limited. In 2012 it was 4% of immigrants who left, 
compared to 6% in 2009 (558 and 307 individuals respectively). This sample can provide a 
common picture of the immigrants’ behavior but cannot guarantee accuracy in details. This 
problem could be addressed by using the full sample, which is unfortunately not provided to 
students. Secondly, I am not able to use variables as educational level and industry sector due 
to missing observations. The latter could be useful in the income analysis. It would be also 
very useful to know more about the immigrants’ closest family: either the family members are 
left in the source country or are they also in Norway, what is the nationality of the 
immigrants’ spouses. These details may have a significant effect on the out-migration. 
Further, disadvantage is that the data provided by SSB covers regions instead of actual 
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countries. Forming the EU and non-EU areas, I attach the RoBuMo region to the EU and 
Balkans to the opposite site, while these regions are, in fact, mixed: Greece is a member of the 
EU, while Moldova is not. Finally, the administrative out-migration, discussed in Chapter 3, 
by construction provides incorrect dates of moving out. This is a common problem for all 
collected data on immigrants in SSB. Unfortunately, the issue is not easy to address. New 
rules of registering the immigrants must be implemented to fix this.   
This study has important policy immigration implications. On the one hand, my findings 
show a quite beneficial picture for the Norwegian society. I find that least successful and 
presumably low-skilled individuals are more likely to leave Norway, especially when the 
economy is down. It means that stayers are most likely labor market participants and tax 
payers, which also implies lesser burden to welfare systems. On the other hand, the 
assimilation of the immigrants does not seem to be perfect. As discussed in Chapter 3.1, about 
80% of East European immigrants earn less than Norwegian average income level. Perhaps 
new immigration policy instruments are required to help the least “successful” ones to make 
their way to the labor market and to turn into successful and useful society members. As SSB 
informs, the unemployment rate for the immigrants is twice as high as for natives8. The fact 
that high-skilled immigrants (I assume that the earners of the highest income could be 
positively skill-selected) do not tend to return, benefits the host country. However, the loss of 
skilled labor (brain drain) should be a reason for concern to the source countries.  
The time period between 2014 and 2018 must be an interesting field for the future researches. 
It is a period of economic recession which has had negative implications especially for 
Norway as an oil country; while other European countries have not been affected (the 
unemployment rate in Norway in this period has grown, while in most of the EU countries it 
decreased). It may reveal some new patterns in immigration behavior of Eastern Europeans 
under the new economic circumstances.  
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